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ARTICLES
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
G. Alan Tarr*
There is a growing consensus that the interpretation of the federal Con-
stitution should be rooted in the document's text and original meaning.1
Even Ronald Dworkin, long identified with an interpretive approach based
on moral philosophy rather than history and original meaning, has acknowl-
edged there is much to be said for what he terms "semantic originalism. ' 2
* Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies, and Distinguished Professor, Department of
Political Science, Rutgers University (Camden). B.A., College of the Holy Cross, (1968); M.A., Uni-
versity of Chicago (1970); Ph.D., University of Chicago (1976). The author would like to thank Robert
Williams for his many helpful comments on this research.
1. This is, of course, a controversial proposition, and there is a vast literature in constitutional
theory debating it. For thoughtful arguments in favor of this proposition, see Leslie F. Goldstein, In
Defense of the Text: Democracy and Constitutional Theory (Rowman & Littlefield 1991); Keith E.
Wittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (Law-
rence 1999); Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (Princeton U. Press 2004). For discussions
of constitutional theory in the context of state constitutional interpretation, see G. Alan Tarr, Constitu-
tional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 Rutgers L.J. 841 (1991); David R. Keyser,
State Constitutions and Theories of Judicial Review: Some Variations on a Theme, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1051
(1985); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165 (1984);
Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents,
27 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 189 (2002); Russell M. Nigro, Foreword: The Importance of Interpretative
Theory in State Constitutional Law, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 905 (2000); Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Foreword: State
Constitutional Law Lecture: Pragmatic Constitutionalism-Reflections on State Constitutional Theory
and Same-Sex Marriage Claims, 35 Rutgers L.J. 1249 (2004); and James A. Gardner, Interpreting State
Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System (U. Chi. Press 2005).
2. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 119-127 (Princeton U.
Press 1997) (comment by Ronald Dworkin). For Dworkin's earlier advocacy of a marriage between
philosophy and constitutional interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading
of the American Constitution (Oxford U. Press 1996); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard U.
Press 1986); and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U. Press 1977).
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This development at the federal level follows an earlier acceptance at the
state level of constitutional interpretation based on text and original mean-
ing. Scholars and jurists who have championed the independent interpreta-
tion of state constitutions have long argued for close attention to the specif-
ics of the constitutional text and to its generating history. 3 So too have
advocates of the so-called supplemental approach to state constitutional in-
terpretation, which justifies state court departures from United States Su-
preme Court interpretations of analogous federal constitutional provisions
only when state provisions are distinctive textually or historically, i.e.,
when the wording of the state provision differs from that of its federal coun-
terpart or when the history of the state provision shows that it was adopted
for different reasons or arose from a different political context.4 Moreover,
the very nature of state constitutions encourages a textualist or original
meaning approach because, as William Swindler has noted, "[S]tate consti-
tutions are all too detailed and explicit [and] there is a built-in orientation
toward strict construction [i.e., textual analysis]." 5
Even where federal and state courts have both adopted the same inter-
pretive approach, interpretations of state constitutional provisions should
not necessarily mirror the interpretation of analogous federal provisions.
Fidelity to a text requires an understanding of the nature of the text being
interpreted. State constitutions are not simply miniature versions of the
United States Constitution;6 rather, they differ from their federal counter-
part in their language, basic character, generating history, place in the
state's constitutional history, and underlying political philosophy. These
distinctive elements affect how jurists, public officials, and citizens inter-
3. The argument here parallels that of G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 194-195
(Princeton U. Press 1998). "Independent interpretation" refers to interpretation based on the text and
generating history of the state constitutional provision, uninfluenced by the interpretation of similar or
analogous language in other constitutions, including the United States Constitution.
4. For an explanation and critique of the supplemental approach, see Robert F. Williams, In the
Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35
S.C. L. Rev. 353 (1984); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodol-
ogy and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1015 (1997); Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions chs. 6-7 (Oxford U.
Press 2009). Text and generating history are of course important even to state-constitution interpreters
who do not subscribe to originalism. As Stephen Gottlieb has noted, "For those who reject a jurispru-
dence of original intent, constitutional history nevertheless helps us to preserve the lessons embodied in
the drafting of the provisions at issue and to explore the consequences of the language chosen." Stephen
Gottlieb, Foreword: Symposium on State Constitutional History: In Search of a Usable Past, 53 Alb. L.
Rev. 253, 258 (1989).
5. William Swindler, State Constitutions for the Twentieth Century, 50 Neb. L. Rev. 577, 593
(1971).
6. For a detailed discussion of the distinctiveness of state constitutions, see G. Alan Tarr, supra n.
3, at ch. 1.
Vol. 72
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pret-or should interpret-a state constitution. 7 As Justice Hans A. Linde
has noted, "[T]o make an independent argument under the state clause takes
homework-in texts, in history, in alternative approaches of analysis."8
This article details some of the important differences between state
constitutions and their federal counterpart, analyzes the implications of
these differences for state-constitutional interpretation on the basis of text
and original meaning, and then highlights how the practice of interpretation
based on text and original meaning should influence delegates to a possible
constitutional convention in Montana.
I. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Origins
State constitutions are distinctive, first of all, in their origins. The
United States Constitution is a product of the late eighteenth century and
the political thought of that era. In contrast, only three current state consti-
tutions-those of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont-date
from the eighteenth century. The majority of current state constitutions
were adopted in the late nineteenth century, and nine-including Mon-
tana's-were adopted after 1960.9 State constitutions thus have very differ-
ent sets of founders. For example, Montana's Constitutional Convention of
1889 included 16 delegates holding mining interests.' 0 Montana's 1972
Constitutional Convention included 19 women, 13 educators, and 20 farm-
ers and ranchers, not to mention a beekeeper, a retired FBI agent, and a
Methodist minister who preached: "Praise the Lord and pass the Constitu-
tion."1 1
7. Although this article focuses on judicial interpretation, it is important to recognize that state
constitutional interpretation is not dominated by judges in the way federal constitutional interpretation
is. See G. Alan Tarr, For the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional Tradition in Democ-
racy: How Direct?: Views from the Founding Era and the Polling Era (Elliott Abrams, ed., Rowman &
Littlefield 2002); James A. Henretta, The Rise and Decline of "Democratic Republicanism": Political
Rights in New York and the Several States, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 357 (1989); James A. Henretta, Foreword:
Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22 Rutgers L.J. 819 (1991); Douglas S. Reed, Popular
Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 Rutgers L.J. 871 (1999); John
J. Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition (U. Press of Kan. 2006).
8. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev.
379, 392 (1980).
9. For information on the number of constitutions adopted by various states and the dates of their
adoption, see The Book of the States, vol. 41, 12, tbl. 1.1 (Audrey S. Wall & Heather M. Perkins eds.,
Council of St. Govts. 2009).
10. Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 4 (Green-
wood Press 2001).
11. Id. at 11; Harry W. Fritz, The 1972 Montana Constitution in a Contemporary Context, 51
Mont. L. Rev. 270, 273 (1990).
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Although some problems of popular government are endemic-for ex-
ample, how to combine liberty with governmental strength and how to en-
sure that representatives remain faithful to the popular will and the public
interest-others reflect the particularities of place and time. The architects
of state constitutions have had to address a different set of problems than
those that confronted their predecessors in Philadelphia. In part, these dif-
ferences reflect changes in population, economy, and social circumstances.
The differences also reflect the fact that the prevailing understanding of
political life and of the problems of republican government was different in
the antebellum era than in the late eighteenth century, different again in the
late nineteenth century, and different yet again in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury. 12
Historical examples from Montana clarify the point. In the late nine-
teenth century, a major concern of state-constitution makers, particularly in
the western states, was to circumscribe the power of large corporations,
such as railroads and mining companies. 13  These corporate giants were
perceived as exercising excessive economic and political power, and these
provisions were aimed at ensuring public policy reflected the popular will
rather than corporate interests. 14 The 1889 Montana Constitution reflects
this concern with combatting "minority faction" rather than restraining
"majority faction."' t5 For example, the Constitution abrogated the "fellow-
servant" rule, a common-law doctrine that prevented workers from collect-
ing damages through litigation for work-related injuries.1 6 It also specifi-
cally forbade enactment of retroactive laws favorable to railroads, and it
attempted to prevent state officials from being corrupted by corporate inter-
12. Tarr, supra n. 3, at chs. 3-5; see generally Dinan, supra n. 7. For an account of state constitu-
tional thought in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Christian G. Fritz, American Sovereigns:
The People and America's Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War (Cambridge U. Press 2008),
and Laura Scalia, America's Jeffersonian Experiment: Remaking State Constitutions, 1820-1850 (N. I11.
U. Press 1999). For an account of how the progressive understanding of constitutions and constitution-
alism differed from that of the founding generation, see Bradley C. S. Watson, Living Constitution,
Dying Faith: Progressivism and the New Science of Jurisprudence (ISI Books 2009). For a perceptive
account of state constitutionalism during the Progressive Era, see John Dinan, Framing a "People's
Government": State Constitution-Making in the Progressive Era, 30 Rutgers L.J. 933 (1999).
13. This concern about corporate power surfaced even prior to the Civil War. For an account of the
debate over corporate power in the California convention of 1849, see David Alan Johnson, Founding
the Far West: California, Oregon, and Nevada, 1840-1890 223-268 (U. Cal. Press1992). For an over-
view of late-nineteenth-century debates, see Gordon Morris Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Mak-
ing, 1850-1912 (Greenwood Press 1987).
14. Tarr, supra n. 3, at 115-117; Bakken, supra n. 13, at ch. 7.
15. The Montana delegates of the late nineteenth century thus differed from their predecessors in
Philadelphia a century earlier in their assessment of the most serious threat to good republican govern-
ment. For the eighteenth-century view that the major threat to republican government was majority
faction, see James Madison, The Federalist No. 10 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., The Knickerbocker Press
1888).
16. Mont. Const. art. XV, § 16 (1889) (superseded 1972 by Mont. Const.).
Vol. 72
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ests by establishing limits on the gifts and other benefits public officials
could accept. 17 Furthermore, the 1889 Montana Constitution prohibited
bringing armed men into the State, thereby restricting mine owners' use of
force in their conflicts with labor unions. 18
At the same time, the Montana delegates were reluctant to impose
overly stringent restrictions on corporations; they recognized the corpora-
tions' importance as a source of capital for economic development. For
example, the Montana delegates exempted minerals from taxation to placate
the mining industry. 19 In addition, they voted down a proposal to make
corporate directors and stockholders jointly liable for corporate debts, heed-
ing one delegate's warning that it would "not only drive all foreign capital
invested in the state away . . . but would prevent all future inquiries. 20
Finally, the delegates sought to "protect the new state from the corruption
of the east by attempting to ensure frugality and honesty in government. '21
Many decades later, drafting Montana's current Constitution, the dele-
gates to Montana's 1972 Constitutional Convention again responded to the
events and controversies of their era. In the wake of the Vietnam War and
the turbulence of the 1960s, many Americans were skeptical of govern-
ment. Montana's delegates responded by enhancing direct popular partici-
pation in government. They relaxed the requirements for placing initiatives
and referenda on the ballot, required periodic popular consideration of
whether to hold a constitutional convention, inserted a "right-to-know" pro-
vision to ensure greater transparency and accountability, and established a
right of public participation in the operations of governmental agencies.22
Acting in the aftermath of the civil-rights movement, delegates expressly
protected human dignity and barred discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious
ideas. 23 Familiar with the efforts to bar private discrimination in the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Montana
delegates extended these guarantees to address private and official discrimi-
nation.24 Finally, reflecting the renewed interest during the late 1960s and
early 1970s in protecting and preserving the environment, the Montana del-
17. Id. at art. XV, § 13 (retroactive laws) and art. V, §§ 42-43 (bribery). For a discussion of these
provisions in Montana and other states, see John D. Hicks, The Constitutions of the Northwest States
56-63 (U. Neb. 1923).
18. Mont. Const. art. I, § 31 (1889) (superseded 1972 by Mont. Const.).
19. Id. at art. XII, § 3.
20. Bakken, supra n. 13, at 78.
21. Richard Roeder, The 1972 Montana Constitution in Historical Context, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 260,
262-263 (1990). See generally G. Alan Tarr, The Montana Constitution: A National Perspective, 64
Mont. L. Rev. 1 (2003).
22. Mont. Const. art. 1i, §§ 4-5; art. XIV, § 3; art. HI, § 9; art. II, § 8.
23. Id. at art. 11, § 4.
24. Id.
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egates announced a constitutional commitment to environmental quality in
the Preamble and devoted an entire article of the Constitution to "Environ-
ment and Natural Resources. '25
What Montana's experience shows is that the problems that confront
state-constitution makers are often unique, and the solutions they choose
reflect political circumstances in the state, the experience of sister states,
and the prevailing political views of the era. The distinctiveness of state
constitutions is apparent even in the founding era, as a comparison of the
federal Constitution and early state constitutions reveals.26 With the pas-
sage of time, new political understandings have been reflected in state con-
stitutions. To choose one example from many, eighteenth-century constitu-
tions-whether state or federal-only guaranteed "negative" rights against
government, whereas many twentieth-century constitutions have incorpo-
rated guarantees of positive rights as well. 2
7
B. Legal Premises
State constitutions are likewise distinctive in their legal premises. The
federal Constitution is understood as a grant of power, and the government
is limited to those powers delegated to it by the Constitution. 28 In contrast,
state governments have generally been understood as possessing plenary
legislative power.29 Accordingly, state constitutions operate primarily as
documents of limitation, placing limits on state governments rather than
25. Id. at preamble, art. IX.
26. Accounts revealing the distinctive political understandings of the initial state constitutions in-
clude: Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the
State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era (U.N.C. Press 1980); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic 1776-1787 (U.N.C. Press 1969); Marc W. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty:
State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America (U.N.C. Press 1997); Donald S. Lutz, Popular
Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early State Constitutions (La. St. U. Press
1980).
27. For an authoritative overview, see Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and the Evolution of State
Constitutions, 33 Rutgers L.J. 799 (2002), and more generally, Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and
State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality, 112 Harv. L . Rev. 1131 (1999).
28. Thus, the federal Constitution enumerates the legislative powers of Congress and limits Con-
gress to those "legislative Powers herein granted." U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. This limited grant of power is
confirmed by the Tenth Amendment, which reads: "All powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. Const. amend. X.
29. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legisla-
tive Power of the States of the American Union 175-179 (8th ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1927) (discuss-
ing the character of state legislative power and listing supporting cases). For indications that the situa-
tion may be somewhat more complicated than it initially appears, see Walter F. Dodd, The Functions of
a State Constitution, 30 Pol. Sci. Q. 201, 205-206 (Acad. Pol. Sci.1915); Robert F. Williams, State
Constitutional Law Processes, 24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 169, 178-79 (1983); Robert F. Williams, Com-
ment: On the Importance of a Theory of Legislative Power Under State Constitutions, 15 Quinnipiac L.
Rev. 57 (1995).
Vol. 72
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granting powers to them.30 Because state legislative power exists in the
absence of constitutional limitations and because state courts have charac-
teristically interpreted such limitations narrowly, 31 many state-constitution
makers have found it necessary to elaborate in considerable detail the re-
strictions they sought to impose. 32 This helps explain why many state con-
stitutions are lengthy documents.
Another explanation can be found in the changing views of the func-
tions that state constitutions should serve. According to Morton Keller,
"The ultimate thrust of constitutional revision after the Civil War was not to
enhance the power of the state but rather 'a grand design to reduce the field
of state law and withhold from it every subject which it is not necessary to
concede."' 33 Obviously, this effort to deny powers to state legislatures re-
quired a proliferation of prohibitions. Other scholars have found that state-
constitution makers in western states in the late nineteenth century, while
suspicious of state legislatures, also wished to expand the powers of gov-
ernment to deal with emerging problems. 34 This too required constitutional
expansion, especially insofar as these delegates inserted public-policy man-
dates directly into state constitutions so that constitutions "increasingly be-
came instruments of government rather than merely frameworks for govern-
ment. ' '35 Again, the result was lengthier constitutions. Today, 30 state con-
stitutions contain more than 20,000 words. 36 Even the 1972 Montana
Constitution is more than 14,000 words long.37 Put differently, state consti-
tutions offer textualists a lot of text to interpret.
The federal Constitution grants powers and imposes limitations on
power. But state constitutions also impose duties on state governments.
Thus, the Montana Constitution aims for "a system of education which will
develop the full educational potential of each person," and to that end, di-
30. As the Kansas Supreme Court has observed, "Where the constitutionality of a [state] statute is
involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by the constitution, but
whether it is prohibited thereby." State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978);
see also Frank P. Grad & Robert F. Williams, State Constitutions for the Twenty-first Century, Volume
2: Drafting State Constitutions, Revisions, and Amendments ch. 2 (SUNY Press 2006).
31. See Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, supra n. 4, at 251, 267-279.
32. See e.g. Neb. Const. Art. 1m, § 14; N.M. Const. art. IV, §§ 15-21. For an overview of these
limitations and their genesis, see Charles Chauncey Binney, Restrictions upon Local and Special Legis-
lation in State Constitutions, 41 Amer. L. Register & Rev. 1019, 1024-28 (1894).
33. Morton Keller, Affairs of the State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America 112
(Harvard U. Press 1977) (quoting Simeon E. Baldwin).
34. See e.g. Amy Bridges, Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the
Western States, 22 Studies Am. Pol. Dev. 32 (Spring 2008).
35. Tarr, supra n. 3, at 132. See also Christopher W. Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong?
Rethinking the American Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions, 93 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 837 (1999).
36. The Book of the States, supra n. 9, at 12.
37. Id.
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rects the Legislature to "provide a basic system of free quality public ele-
mentary and secondary schools. '38 Other state constitutions likewise im-
pose educational responsibilities. For example, the New Jersey Constitu-
tion mandates that "[t]he Legislature shall provide for the support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools," 39 and the Texas Con-
stitution says that "it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to
establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an
efficient system of public free schools." 40
The duties assigned to state governments are not limited to education.
The Montana Constitution mandates that "the state and each person shall
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for
present and future generations" and directs the Legislature to "provide for
the administration and enforcement of that duty."' 4 1 Alaska's government is
directed to "provide for the promotion and protection of public health,"42
and Idaho's government is directed "to pass all necessary laws to provide
for the protection of livestock against the introduction or spread" of various
diseases.43 These duties and the alleged failure of state governments to
meet their responsibilities can provide a basis for litigation quite different in
character from that found under the federal Constitution. In Montana, for
example, the Montana Supreme Court has heard challenges based on state
obligations to ensure "equality of educational opportunity" and "provide a
basic system of free quality public schools" 44 and to "maintain and improve
a clean and healthful environment. '45
C. Changeability
State constitutions are also distinctive because of the propensity of
state-constitution makers to amend and revise them. The federal Constitu-
tion was adopted 222 years ago and has been amended only 27 times. In
contrast, states change their constitutions regularly, amending them fre-
quently and even replacing them periodically. Only 19 states retain their
38. Mont. Const. art. X, §§ 1, 3.
39. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, 1.
40. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1.
41. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1, cl. 1, 2.
42. Alaska Const. art. V1, § 4.
43. Idaho Const. art. XVI, § 1.
44. Mont. Const. art. X, §§ 1, 3; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690
(Mont. 1989).
45. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1; Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality & Seven-Up Pete
Joint Venture, 988 P.2d 1286 (1999). See more generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Environment
and Natural Resources, in State Constitutions for the Twenty-first Century, Volume 3: The Agenda of
State Constitutional Reform ch. 10 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., SUNY Press, 2006) [here-
inafter The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform].
Vol. 72
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original constitutions, and most states have had three or more. 46 Most cur-
rent state constitutions have averaged more than one constitutional amend-
ment for every year since their passage.47 Montana ranks just below aver-
age, having adopted only two constitutions and, as of 2008, having
amended its current Constitution only 30 times. 48
This changeability complicates the task of state constitutional interpre-
tation in at least three respects. First, state-constitution interpreters must
interpret current constitutional provisions in light of their similarity to or
divergence from their predecessors in earlier constitutions of the state, and
they must interpret the language of any constitutional amendment in light of
the changes it introduced to the constitution. 49 Second, given the frequency
of amendment, state-constitution interpreters are often placed in the posi-
tion of having to reconcile provisions adopted at various points in time that
at least potentially reflect differing political perspectives. 50 Third, insofar
as states often borrow ideas and provisions from sister states, state-constitu-
tion interpreters must be aware of the origins of a state's provision and how
the similar language was interpreted in the originating state.5 1
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Interpretation of a state constitution in light of its text and original
meaning plays out in ways that are neither consistently liberal nor consist-
ently conservative from a political perspective. Some examples from the
civil-liberties area illustrate the point.52
One can begin with the issue of public-school finance. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,53 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that even though Texas's reliance on local property taxes to
finance public schools led to substantial inter-district differences in per-pu-
pil funding, this did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 54 This ruling, while dispositive for federal constitu-
tional law, was altogether irrelevant for state constitutional interpretation.
The pertinent state constitutional language is very different from the federal
Equal Protection Clause, as evidenced by the education provisions quoted
46. The Book of the States, supra n. 9 at 12.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. For a more detailed discussion of the complexities posed by multiple constitutions and constitu-
tional borrowing, see Tarr, supra note 3, at ch. 6.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. For an authoritative consideration of how to interpret state guarantees of civil liberties, see
Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, supra n. 4, at ch. 6.
53. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
54. Id. at 54-55.
9
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earlier.55 Moreover, the constitutional language in Montana and other
states was adopted by different sets of founders and at different points in
time than the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The
Montana Supreme Court concluded that spending disparities among school
districts unconstitutionally denied equality of educational opportunity
among students.56 However, courts in other states have varied in their
views as to whether their state constitutions permit or prohibit the inter-
district disparities that result from reliance on local property taxes. 57 What
is clear is that Rodriguez offers little guidance for states attempting to an-
swer this question.
A second instructive issue is voucher plans for school choice, which
may enable students to use state-provided vouchers to attend parochial
schools. The United States Supreme Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
ruled that voucher programs do not violate the federal Establishment
Clause.5 8 However, the text and generating history of state provisions con-
cerning religion are very different. Most states have a functional analogue
of the Establishment Clause, though typically it is more detailed than the
federal provision.59 Montana is an outlier here-its religious-freedom pro-
vision is virtually identical to the First Amendment which provides: "The
state shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof."'60  Even so, Montana does not necessarily
follow the federal lead on matters of church and state. Like most other state
constitutions, the Montana Constitution also includes provisions dealing
specifically with state aid to religious schools. Article X, § 6 begins:
The Legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public Corpora-
tions shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any
public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other property for any secta-
rian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college, univer-
sity, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by
any church, sect, or denomination.
6 1
55. See e.g. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
1195 (1985); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Equality and Liberty in the Golden Age of State Constitutional Law
(Oxford U. Press 2008); supra n. 36-38 and accompanying text.
56. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690.
57, For a discussion and listing of state cases on public school finance, see G. Alan Tarr, Judicial
Process and Judicial Policymaking 311-318 (5th ed., Cengage Learning 2010). See generally Douglas
S. Reed, On Equal Terms: The Constitutional Politics of Educational Opportunity (Princeton U. Press
2001).
58. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
59. For an analysis of the differences between federal and state protections, see G. Alan Tarr,
Church and State in the States, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 73 (1989); Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around
Comes Around: The New Relevancy of State Constitutional Religion Clauses, 38 Val. U. L. Rev. 353
(2004).
60. Mont. Const. art. 11, § 5.
61. Id. at art. X, § 6, 1. Although this language is virtually identical to Article XI, § 8 of the 1889
Montana Constitution, the delegates to the 1972 convention added a second paragraph designed to pro-
Vol. 72
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This comprehensive and explicit ban on aid to sectarian institutions, which
dates from the 1889 Constitution, seems a more substantial barrier to state
aid than the First Amendment. At a minimum, an interpreter committed to
textual analysis must address what this provision adds to the Establishment
Clause found in Article II, § 5 of the Montana Constitution and its influence
on state-provided vouchers.
Another issue of particular interest under the Montana Constitution is
freedom of speech or expression. Montana's Article II, § 7 reads:
No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech or expression. Every
person shall be free to speak or publish whatever he will on any subject, being
responsible for all abuse of that liberty. In all suits and prosecutions for libel
or slander the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and the jury, under the
direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts. 62
Although the language of the first clause resembles the First Amendment, a
state-constitution interpreter cannot treat the other clauses as mere surplus-
age. Indeed, the constitution makers' decision not merely to replicate the
First Amendment suggests an intended difference in constitutional meaning.
Several aspects of this provision are particularly noteworthy. First, the
Montana provision not only bans interferences with freedom of speech but
also provides a positive freedom to speak. Some states with similar provi-
sions have interpreted this positive right as broader than that guaranteed by
the First Amendment, encompassing a right in some circumstances to speak
on private property open to the public. 63 Second, the Montana provision
protects a right not only of speech but also of "expression." The use of this
term represents a shift from the 1889 Constitution,64 and a constitution in-
terpreter would have to determine the meaning of this change. This addi-
tion is logically viewed as protecting something beyond what was protected
by the 1889 language, though exactly what this right of free expression
encompasses is not obvious on its face. Third, the Montana Constitution
specifically protects speech "on any subject." The United States Supreme
Court has tended to distinguish the level of protection for speech depending
tect federal grants from being rejected by constitutional mandate. The second paragraph reads: "This
section shall not apply to funds from federal sources provided to the state for the express purpose of
distribution to nonpublic education." See also Elison & Snyder, supra n. 10, at 181-182.
62. Mont. Const. art. II, § 7.
63. See e.g. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal.1979); State v. Schmid, 423
A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981) (en
banc). For a discussion of these cases, see G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutionalism and "First Amend-
ment" Rights, in Human Rights in the States: New Directions in Constitutional Policymaking ch. 2
(Stanley Friedelbaum ed., Greenwood Press 1988); Sanford Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right
of Access to Private Property under State Constitutional Law, in Developments in State Constitutional
Law 51-70 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., West 1985).
64. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 (1889) (superseded 1972 by Mont. Const. art II, § 7).
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on its character, with the greatest protection accorded to political speech. 65
The language of the Montana Constitution, however, seems to point in a
different direction. Thus, the precedents of the United States Supreme
Court regarding the First Amendment may not provide much assistance in
interpreting the distinctive language of the Montana Constitution. 66
Also of interest under the Montana Constitution is the right to bear
arms. The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution reads: "A
well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 67 Advo-
cates and opponents of restrictions on the private possession of firearms
have offered starkly divergent interpretations of the amendment, with gun-
control advocates claiming that it protects only a collective right to bear
arms and then only while in service in the militia.68 Recently, in District of
Columbia v. Heller, a closely divided Supreme Court disagreed and held the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms with few limi-
tations. 69
But even prior to Heller, the "collective-right" understanding had no
place in the interpretation of the Montana Constitution. Article II, § 12 of
the Montana Constitution states: "The right of any person to keep or bear
arms in defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but
nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed
weapons."'70 It thus makes abundantly clear that the Montana Constitution
protects an individual right, not a collective right, to bear arms and that the
right extends to personal self-defense as well as to defense of the State.
65. E.g. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. Despite these differences in language, Larry Elison and Fritz Snyder have concluded: "The
Montana Supreme Court has been cautious in interpreting the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press. It has not pushed the limits of free speech beyond what the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment requires." Elison and Snyder, supra n. 10, at 43-44.
67. U.S. Const. amend. 11.
68. Proponents of the collective-right approach include Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan,
The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 5 (1989); Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16 Const.
Commentary 247 (1999); Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Sec-
ond Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 Const. Com-
mentary 221 (1999). Proponents of the personal-right approach, which has found increasing scholarly
support in recent years, include Stephen P. Halbrook, The Founders' Second Amendment: Origins of the
Right to Bear Arms (Ivan R. Dee 2008); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
Yale L.J. 637 (1989); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L.
Rev. 461 (1995); Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793
(1998). For an effort to offer an alternative that bridges the gap between the two approaches, see David
C. Williams, The Mythic Meanings of the Second Amendment: Taming Political Violence in a Constitu-
tional Republic (Yale U. Press 2003).
69. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
70. Mont. Const. art. II, § 12.
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Thus far, the focus has been on state provisions that either have no
federal analogue or differ textually from the guarantees of the federal Bill of
Rights. This is certainly important in Montana because the Montana Consti-
tution has 17 provisions in its Declaration of Rights that have no parallel in
the federal Bill of Rights. 71 However, because state supreme courts are the
authoritative interpreters of state constitutions, the opportunity for indepen-
dent interpretation exists even when the language of state and federal guar-
antees is the same.
This is reflected in the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Most state guarantees-including Montana's-are
identical or virtually identical in language to the federal Fourth Amend-
ment, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures. '72 This textual sim-
ilarity, however, does not require-and need not require-state courts to
reach the same results as the United States Supreme Court reaches in Fourth
Amendment cases. For example, several courts have considered whether
police can constitutionally search trash bags without a warrant when the
bags have been deposited on the curb for collection. In California v.
Greenwood, the United States Supreme Court concluded the Fourth
Amendment did not require police to obtain a search warrant to search the
trash.73 One year later, confronting the same set of facts and interpreting a
state constitutional provision virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment,
the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hempele reached the opposite
conclusion.74 Whether or not the New Jersey Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the New Jersey Constitution was correct, it was perfectly legitimate
for the New Jersey justices to disagree with the United States Supreme
Court even though the text of the federal and state constitutions were the
same.
75
The legitimacy of the New Jersey Supreme Court's disagreement
stems from two factors. First, the New Jersey justices were interpreting a
different document, and a different generating history might justify a diver-
gent interpretation of identical language. Second, even if the meanings of
the state and federal constitutional provisions are the same, the New Jersey
71. Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: The Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
1095, 1122 (1985).
72. The Montana provision reads: "The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing." Mont. Const. art. 11, § 11.
On the substance of state guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure more generally, see Barry
Latzer, State Constitutional Criminal Law (Thomas Leg. Publg., Inc. 1995).
73. Cal. v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
74. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 810 (N.J. 1990).
75. Robert F. Williams has provided the most thoughtful elaboration of this position. See Williams,
In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra n. 4; Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court, supra n. 4.
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Supreme Court can legitimately disagree with the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation. 76
When interpreting the federal Constitution, a state court must adhere to
authoritative Supreme Court precedents. But when interpreting its own
state constitution, the state supreme court is the authoritative interpreter and
is obliged to give the best interpretation even if it diverges from the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of identical language. 77 Rulings of
the United States Supreme Court may be persuasive authority for state-con-
stitution interpretation, but they are no more authoritative than other state
supreme courts' interpretations of their own constitutions.78 Otherwise, as
Judge Dorothy Beasley has noted, "The virtual piggybacking of the state
clause onto the federal clause renders the former a parasite instead of an
independent source of authority. '79
Of course, state judges are not obliged to depart from federal precedent
in interpreting identical language in their own constitutions. State judges
may find the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the constitu-
tional text persuasive. This appears to be the case in Montana with search-
and-seizure law. Larry Elison and Fritz Snyder observe: "Generally, cases
raising search and seizure questions under Article II, Section 11 of the
Montana Constitution followed the lead of the United States Supreme
Court. ' 80 Montana is hardly alone in this respect. 81 Nonetheless, state
judges always retain the power to reasonably disagree with the rulings of
the Supreme Court when interpreting state guarantees.
This article has focused on examples drawn from guarantees of civil
liberties, but the same principles apply to interpretation of other state con-
stitutional provisions as well. For example, state understandings of the sep-
aration of powers and of the definition of executive, legislative, and judicial
powers may also be distinctive. 82 For state-constitution interpreters, the sit-
uation is simultaneously daunting and invigorating. They may not simply
rely on doctrines and precedents from the nation's capital; they must closely
76. Id.
77. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, supra n. 4, at 193-200.
78. Id.
79. Dorothy T. Beasley, The Georgia Bill of Rights: Dead or Alive?, 34 Emory L.J. 341, 414
(1985).
80. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 10, at 53.
81. See Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and Judi-
cial Policymaking, 16 Just. Sys. J. 37 (1992-1994); Susan P. Fino, The Role of State Supreme Courts in
the New Judicial Federalism 142 (Greenwood Press 1987); and Michael Esler, State Supreme Court
Commitment to State Law, 78 Judicature 25 (1994-1995).
82. On state separation of powers doctrine, see G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers
in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. Annual Survey Am. L. 329 (2003); Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency
and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 79 (1998);
Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, supra n. 4, at ch. 8.
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analyze state sources. 83 Yet if one is committed to a vibrant American fed-
eralism, this is as it should be.84 Each state is a distinct polity with its own
fundamental law, and it is appropriate in a federal system that state constitu-
tions receive the same close attention and careful study as is given to the
federal Constitution.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTION MAKERS
The discussion of state constitutions thus far should be of particular
interest to those involved in drafting constitutions because insight into how
judges will approach the interpretation of their handiwork may enable draft-
ers to better frame provisions in order to achieve their objectives. In addi-
tion, there are some distinctive challenges that jurists confront in state con-
stitutional interpretation. This section will explore how this insight can
guide the task of constitutional drafting. 85
In drafting constitutional provisions, drafters must first be cognizant of
the legal parameters within which they operate. Article XIV, § 1 of the
Montana Constitution authorizes the Legislature to call an "unlimited con-
vention," and § 2 of the same Article allows voters to call an "unlimited
convention" by initiative. It is reasonable to conclude that the periodic sub-
mission to the voters of whether to call a convention means an unlimited
convention. 86 Thus, delegates are not constrained by state law as to the
subjects they can consider and the provisions they can propose. However,
voters are constrained in their proposal of constitutional amendments via
the initiative. Article XIV, § 11 of the Montana Constitution states that "if
more than one amendment is submitted at the same election, each shall be
so prepared and distinguished that it can be voted on separately. ' 87 Relying
on that language, the Montana Supreme Court in Marshall v. State ex rel.
Cooney struck down an amendment that required voter approval for all new
taxes, because the amendment amended three parts of the Montana Consti-
83. See Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59
N.Y.U. Annual Survey Am. L. 211 (2003).
84. "Therefore, rather than blindly following federal precedent, state judges should independently
seek their own best interpretation of their state constitutions. This does not mean that they should
altogether ignore federal rulings-they may be adopted or rejected, depending on their inherent persua-
siveness. But when state judges forthrightly assert their own perspectives, it is argued, the result is a
healthier and more vibrant federalism." Tarr, supra n. 1.
85. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, supra n. 4, at ch. 4; Grad & Williams,
supra n. 30, at chs. 3, 5.
86. Mont. Const. art XIV, §§ 1-3. In permitting only unlimited constitutional conventions, Mon-
tana is in a minority among the states. See Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision,
in The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform, supra n. 45, at 177, 194.
87. Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 11.
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tution and failed to allow a separate vote for the amendment of each provi-
sion.88
Constitution drafters must also be aware that the Supremacy Clause of
the federal Constitution dictates that state constitutions are subordinate to
valid federal law, whether constitutional, statutory, or administrative. 89
Therefore, drafters must be aware of and avoid drafting provisions that con-
flict with applicable federal law. When federal law changes, drafters may
be obliged to rewrite provisions that were previously acceptable. As Frank
Grad and Robert Williams have noted, the United States Supreme Court's
"one person, one vote" rulings and Congress's enactment of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 exemplify how changes in federal law may require a
response from state-constitution drafters, requiring changes in state consti-
tutions to extend voting rights and reapportion state legislatures. 90 Yet per-
tinent federal law may be the beginning rather than the end of a drafter's
investigation, for federal law may merely preclude certain means of achiev-
ing the drafter's aim and not the pursuit of the objective by alternative
means. For example, states can pursue equality of educational opportunity
through affirmative action programs in admissions, but not through pro-
grams that establish racial quotas or fail to consider applicants as individu-
als rather than merely members of groups.91
State-constitution makers must also be aware that judicial interpreta-
tion of their handiwork will occur in the context of what might be called a
"universe of constitutions. ' 92 Whereas justices of the United States Su-
preme Court only rarely seek guidance in the rulings of state supreme
courts or lower federal courts, 93 state judges regularly inquire into how sis-
ter courts, both state and federal, have interpreted similar provisions. 94
Other states' opinions may be a source of legal doctrine and often serve as
persuasive precedent. This is hardly surprising; in consulting the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of sister states, state judges are merely extending into
the realm of constitutional interpretation a mode of decision-making that
they have long employed in common-law cases. 95
88. Marshall v. State ex reL Cooney, 975 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1999).
89. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
90. Grad & Williams, supra n. 30, at 35.
91. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
92. The discussion in this and succeeding paragraphs draws upon Tarr, supra n. 3, at 199-208.
93. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Supreme Court Judge versus United States Supreme Court
Justice: A Change in Function and Perspective, 19 Fla. L. Rev. 225 (1966); J. Skelly Wright, In Praise
of State Courts: Confession of a Federal Judge, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 165 (1984).
94. See Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme
Courts, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 178-193 (1985); Tart, supra n. 3, at 199-201.
95. This can be problematic. As Justice Hans Linde has noted, state courts may as a result "find
themselves pulled between fidelity to the state's own charter and the sense that constitutional law is a
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Drafters should also understand that in consulting other constitutions,
judges will likely begin with their own state's prior constitutions. Although
these documents will not assist in the interpretation of entirely new provi-
sions, they can provide insight into both constitutional modifications and
continuities. If delegates have modified a provision's text, interpreters must
assume the change was introduced for a purpose. Sometimes it is clear
from the context that the change merely involved constitutional housekeep-
ing, an attempt to eliminate archaic language. For example, in 2007, New
Jersey amended its Constitution to rephrase a provision that denied the vote
to those lacking mental capacity; the new language reflected modem termi-
nology and deleted terminology that is now considered offensive. 96 Some-
times linguistic changes involve an effort to remove from the constitution
essentially "statutory" provisions. For example, the Louisiana Constitu-
tional Convention of 1973 devoted most of its energies to simplifying and
shortening the State's existing Constitution by removing statutory, obsolete,
and inconsistent material, and the voters of Louisiana adopted their handi-
work in 1974. Some of the excised material was subsequently enacted as
statutes. 97 Most often, however, constitution makers alter constitutional
language in order to introduce changes in meaning. Therefore, judges typi-
cally determine the meaning of constitutional language in part by examin-
ing the language it replaced. 98 Put differently, judges consider not only a
state constitution's current provision but also the previous version and the
way it was interpreted by the courts.
What does this mean for state-constitution makers? If they change the
wording of a provision, they can expect courts to interpret their action as
introducing a change in constitutional meaning. As Frank Grad and Robert
Williams caution, "The guiding rule for the drafter ought to be that as far as
possible the traditional, frequently construed terminology ought to be used
in new constitutional provisions unless a change of law or different mean-
ing is intended." 99 Furthermore, if modem terms are substituted merely to
shared enterprise." Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law? 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 215, 228
(1992); see generally Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions are Not Common Law: Comments on Gard-
ner's Failed Discourse, 24 Rutgers L.J. 927 (1993). For a sophisticated argument in favor of a national
state constitutional law, rather than a state-specific version, see Gardner, supra n. 1. For a collection of
thoughtful essays on state constitutional interpretation in a federal system, see James A. Gardner & Jim
Rossi, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms (Oxford U. Press 2009).
96. The earlier version of the provision read: "No idiot or insane person shall enjoy the right of
suffrage." The amended version reads: "No person who has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction to lack the capacity to understand the act of voting shall enjoy the right of suffrage." See
N.J. Const., Art. II, § 1, 6.
97. See Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 17-18 (Greenwood
Publg. Group 1991).
98. For examples of interpreters engaging in a comparative analysis of current and prior constitu-
tions, see Tarr, supra n. 3, at 201-202.
99. Grad & Williams, supra n. 30, at 55.
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replace archaic phraseology, "the record ought to establish that no change in
meaning was intended." 100 Finally, drafters should be particularly careful
about linguistic changes in bills of rights "where archaic usages have fre-
quently achieved not only a settled meaning but also considerable popular
veneration."'01
What may be less obvious is that if constitution makers carry over
language unchanged from a prior constitution, this also affects judicial in-
terpretation. Judges are likely to interpret the retention of the same lan-
guage from one constitution to the next as a decision not to change constitu-
tional meaning. 10 2 This situation is comparable to legislative reenactment
of a statute after it has been interpreted by the courts. Because legislators
had the opportunity to amend the statute if they disagreed with the court's
interpretation, their failure to amend it during reenactment can be under-
stood as an affirmation of the court's interpretation. Thus, "a standard
source on statutory construction has concluded that 'where the legislature
adopts an expression which has received judicial interpretation, interpreta-
tion is prima facie evidence of legislative intent."1 03
Applying this same logic to constitutional revision, judges may well
conclude that retention of constitutional language entails an endorsement of
the provision's judicial interpretation, effectively making authoritative the
body of case law developed under the preceding constitution. This would
mean that neither judges nor other constitution interpreters could legiti-
mately diverge from the interpretation that had been ratified by reenact-
ment. '04
I have suggested elsewhere that the analogy between a statute's reen-
actment of a statute and the carrying over of a constitutional provision is
less than perfect and that constitutional ratification lacks the character of
active endorsement that is found in the reenactment of a statute.105 But
judges remain free to accept or reject that argument, and state-constitution
makers must consider potential future judicial behavior. Because courts
may well treat retained constitutional language the way they treat reenacted
statutes, constitution makers must factor this into their deliberations. If they
agree with the court's interpretation of a constitutional provision, they
would be wise not to fiddle with the language. If, however, they are either
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Grad & Williams, supra n. 30, at 55.
103. Tarr, supra n. 3, at 203 (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 69 (5th
ed., Clark Boardman Callaghan 1992). Not all scholars agree with this conclusion. See e.g. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 243-245, 311-312 (Harvard U. Press 1994).
104. See e.g. Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1962); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960);
Hitchcock v. State, 131 A.2d 714 (Md. 1957).
105. Tarr, supra n. 3, at 204-205.
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dissatisfied with the court's interpretation of a provision or wish to provide
judges greater leeway to alter interpretation in light of changed conditions
or attitudes, then the constitution makers should avoid merely carrying over
the familiar language.
Drafters should also realize that judges are unlikely to limit their atten-
tion to earlier constitutions of their own state or even sister states from
whom constitutional provisions were borrowed. Drafters of state constitu-
tions often borrow from sister states' constitutions or from the United States
Constitution.10 6 Such borrowing may occur because the sister states share a
similar heritage and political outlook or because they have developed solu-
tions for problems that the constitution makers are facing. Whatever the
reason, in engaging in borrowing from other states, state-constitution mak-
ers choose among various formulations, and judges must take this choice
into account in their interpretation of a "borrowed" provision.
For example, states' right-to-privacy provisions differ, as do provi-
sions concerning gender equality.107 When constitution-drafters decide to
borrow another state's constitutional language, what exactly are they incor-
porating?10 8 Does a borrowing state thereby adopt the meaning of the pro-
vision in the originating state? Or, more to the point, does it endorse the
meaning given to the provision by the courts of the originating state, so that
this interpretation becomes part of the borrowing state's constitution? This
is a serious concern, because in interpreting a state constitution on the basis
of text and original meaning, judges are expected to look to the origins of
the provisions as elaborated by the courts of the originating state. For state-
constitution makers, the lesson is clear: they must be aware of the judicial
interpretation of constitutional language in the state from which they are
borrowing, and if they disagree with that interpretation, they should use
alternative language that does not come with the baggage of judicial prece-
dent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Writing at the time of the American founding, John Adams noted,
"How few of the human race . . . have ever enjoyed an opportunity of
106. Montana's constitution makers may have looked even further afield. The human dignity guar-
antee of Article I, § 4 apparently came from the Puerto Rican Declaration of Rights. See Elison &
Snyder, supra n. 10, at 34. More generally, see Tarr, supra n. 3, at 50-55.
107. On privacy, see Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights,
Claims, and Defenses ch. 2 (4th ed., LexisNexis 2006). On gender equality, see G. Alan Tarr & Mary
Cornelia Porter, Gender Equality and Judicial Federalism: The Role of State Appellate Courts, 9 Has-
tings Const. L.Q. 919 (1981). See generally Robert F. Williams, Rights, in The Agenda of State Consti-
tutional Reform, supra n. 45, at ch. 1.
108. For further elaboration of this argument, see Tarr, supra n. 3, at 206-207.
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making an election of government, more than of air, soil, or climate for
themselves or their children!"' 9 But Montana's constitution makers of
1972, wisely heeding Thomas Jefferson's admonition that each new genera-
tion should have the opportunity to revise the framework under which they
are governed, provided for the public to periodically decide whether to call
a new convention.1 10 The citizens of Montana themselves overwhelmingly
voted against a convention in 1990, and they did so in 2010 as well, though
by a lesser margin.I 1' In doing so, they aligned themselves with the vast
majority of states that have regularly rejected convention calls: between
1970 and 2002, the outcome of votes on automatic convention calls was
positive only four times and negative 25 times. In 2008, more than 60% of
voters in Connecticut, Hawaii, and Illinois rejected conventions calls., 12
And in 2010, voters in Iowa, Maryland, and Michigan, like the voters in
Montana, also voted against calling a convention." 3
Although Montana's voters rejected calling a convention, they did ap-
prove the Montana Prevent Double Taxation Amendment, which had been
proposed by initiative, and it is likely that in future years they will approve
further constitutional changes. 1 4 For those involved in the task of amend-
ing or revising a state constitution, this article can serve a cautionary func-
tion. What the framers devise and the voters ratify will ultimately come
before the state's courts for interpretation, and their interpretations are
likely to be grounded in the text of the constitution and the original meaning
of its words. Recognition of this fact should guide Montana's constitution
makers and constitution amenders in their task, so that the document they
devise will in practice reflect the will of the people and make effectual the
popular sovereignty guaranteed and celebrated in the Montana Constitu-
tion. '' 5
109. Wood, supra n. 26, at 127.
110. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), quoted in Williams, The
Law of American State Constitutions, supra n. 4, at 73-74.
111. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 10, at 16.
112. Benjamin, supra n. 86, at 193; Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, supra n. 4,
at 388.
113. Ballotpedia, Chart of 2010 Ballot Measure Issues, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Chart-
of_2010_ballotmeasureissues (last accessed Jan. 22, 2011 ).
114. Ballotpedia, Montana New Property Tax Elimination Amendment, CI-105, http://ballotpedia.
org/wiki/index.php/Montana-New-Property-Tax-EliminationAmendment,-CI-105-(2010) (last ac-
cessed Jan. 22, 2011).
115. Mont. Const. art. 1, § 1.
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